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Abstract
This article offers a defence of critical realism in the face of objections Nash (2005) makes to it in a  
recent edition of this journal. It is argued that critical and scientific realisms are closely related and that  
both are opposed to statistical positivism. However, the suggestion is made that scientific realism retains 
(from statistical positivism) a number of elements that result in misleading accounts of social processes 
and events: indicators are used which do not reflect the close relationship between structure and agency;  
indicators refer to reified and not real properties of both structures and agents; and indicators do not refer  
to causal properties of objects and entities. In order to develop a narrative of causal processes, as Nash  
argues  researchers  should,  then  some  adjustments  need  to  be  made  to  the  principles  that  underpin 
scientific realism.
Introduction
Roy Nash’s (2005) defence of scientific realism addresses some of the fundamental problems with, as he  
terms  it,  statistical  positivism,  as  well  as  providing  an  important  rationale  for  the  inclusion  of  both 
quantitative and qualitative approaches to collecting and analysing data. Its particular strengths are that, in  
contrast to many of the proposed solutions to the quantitative–qualitative dilemma, it acknowledges that  
researchers have to engage with ontological as well as epistemological issues, and, as a consequence,  
accept that educational research cannot be reduced to ‘method and objectivity’ (cf. Hodkinson, 2004). 
Nash  (2005,  p.  200)  further  suggests  that  some,  though  not  all,  statistical  modelling  of  educational 
settings has operated through indicators which marginalise the dispositions, practices and self-beliefs of  
agents,  and  concludes  that  an  ‘explanation  in  its  most  complete  scheme  has  a  structure-disposition-
practice form that requires the adequate description of structures (properties of social entities), positions  
(properties of individuals that lead to action), and practices (established ways of doing things and hence 
structures of agency)’. His solution is a ‘multilayered’ account, and a ‘hierarchical’ linking of the various 
levels in order to provide a complete explanation of social processes.
In developing his argument, he distinguishes between scientific and critical realism, and since the model 
of critical realism that Nash takes issue with is one that I have articulated (see Scott, 2000), it is important 
to offer a response. Such a response acknowledges, however, that my version of critical realism and his 
version of  scientific  realism are  closely related and,  further  to  this,  that  philosophical  positions,  and 
indeed disputes that involve the taking of any such positions, need to respect both the complexity of the 
arguments that are being made and their origins in the work of others (cf. Hammersley, 2005). Both of us 
also accept that one has to be careful about referencing a particular social theory to one source, such as  
critical or scientific realism, and that one has to take account of a range of views which may at a later  
point in time be labelled as a school of thought. There are, as Nash suggests, other accounts than my own 
which provide a different emphasis on the principles underpinning critical realism. For instance, I take 
issue  with  Bhaskar’s  (1979)  contention  that  both  the  social  and  natural  worlds  can  be  examined  
experimentally, because, firstly, as Manicas (1998, p. 336) argues, ‘the mere fact that, necessarily, the  
social world is mediated by consciousness makes it impossible to say how controlled changes are related 
to what stays the same and how the new condition is then experienced by agents’; and secondly, the social 
world  as  an  object  of  investigation  is  different  from  the  physical  world  (which  can  be  examined 
experimentally), because physical phenomena do not have the capacity to change their form as a result of  
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either being investigated or described,  whereas social  phenomena do.  What,  however,  these different  
realist  perspectives  share  is  a  belief  that  a  correct  account  of  social  processes  has  to  engage  with  
ontological as well as epistemological issues and that the relationship between the two has to reflect the
principles established in both. Finally, both of us believe that the philosophical issue which we address in 
different and conflicting ways—the appropriate relations between ontology, epistemology, strategy and 
method—is central to the work of empirical researchers in the field of education.
My argument  in  Scott  (2000)  ends  with  the  adoption  of  a  similar  position  to  Nash,  which  is  that,  
regardless of how sophisticated the subsequent statistical manipulation of the data is, unless the data in its 
unanalysed form reflect in some sense the way the social world works then an inadequate account of 
social  processes  is  likely to  result.  The  form that  my  argument  here  will  take  is  to:  (i)  set  out  the 
principles  of  critical  realism,  and justify the  emphasis  critical  realists  place  on  the agency–structure  
relationship; (ii) show how these principles are different from the principles of scientific realism, as Nash  
articulates  them;  (iii)  develop a  relational  model  of  structure;  (iv)  suggest  that  the  variable/indicator  
model adopted by statistical positivists is flawed; and finally (v) provide a critical realist alternative to  
both scientific realism and statistical positivism.
Critical Realism
Nash (2005), following Bhaskar (1998), suggests that there are three core elements to critical realism. The  
first of these is that the empirical world cannot constitute the totality of the social world. The second is  
that ‘the domain of the real is more extensive than the domain of the actual’ (Nash, 2005, p. 187); and the 
third is that the social world is stratified, consists of mechanisms at different levels and elements of these 
mechanisms  cannot  necessarily  be  reduced  to  those  of  the  level  from  which  they  have  emerged.  
Furthermore,  entities  have  causal  powers  which  may  or  may  not  be  activated.  Thus,  complete 
explanations of social events and processes cannot be reduced to the intentions and beliefs of agents 
without reference to structural forms, or to structural properties without reference to the intentions and  
beliefs of agents.
Both agents and structures then have real causal powers and in part this is what distinguishes realist from 
empiricist and idealist accounts of social processes, and indeed from methodological individualism.
Methodological individualism for a critical realist, and indeed for a scientific realist, is flawed because  
structural properties with real causal powers are marginalised—only the individual has a real existence.  
Society as a structure is treated as an abstraction or aggregate of individual actions. Buckley (1967, p. 32), 
for example, describes structural properties of objects as heuristic devices and what he means by this is  
that: ‘the ‘‘structure’’ is an abstract construct, not something distinct from the ongoing interactive process  
but rather a temporary, accommodative representation of it at any one time’. Thus, as an abstraction, the 
only causal powers that can be attributed to it are those which are attached to ideas, mediated through 
individual human beings. If structural and indeed agential objects are real then they have to possess causal 
powers, or, to put it another way, they have to be causally efficacious.
And this is what Nash provides by way of his account of a stratified reality, where at each level, objects  
are irreducible to objects at another level, because if they were reducible, then the differently layered  
objects would not have independent powers. However, in order to avoid methodological individualism 
and structural determinism, an account of the relation between the different layers has to be provided and
this is what Nash means by his phrase, ‘a narrative of causal processes’. Researchers are dealing, then,  
with structures with independent powers, though these are not necessarily exercised, and people with 
independent powers, though these in turn are not necessarily exercised. They are also dealing with a 
relationship between the two, and the key issue, indeed the problem that exercises Nash, is whether it is  
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possible at the methodological level ever to have access to the real but not necessarily exercised powers  
that reside in persons or structures. 
Archer (1995) provides a possible solution. She identifies four models for relating structure and agency.  
The  first  is  where  structural  and  agential  properties  are  conflated  so  that  action  is  treated  as 
epiphenomenal.  Such  a  holist  approach  marginalises  the  psychological  level  and  treats  agency  as  
superfluous to explanations of social processes. Archer’s second position is the reverse, where structures  
are understood as aggregates or abstractions of individual actions. Her third position is where agency and 
structure  are  tied so closely together  that  neither  can be  said to  have  independent  powers.  Archer’s 
solution  is  what  she  calls  a  morphostatic/morphogenetic  framework  in  which  she  allocates  potential  
powers to both agency and structure by separating them in time, so that for every action endless cycles of 
structural conditioning, social interaction and structural elaboration take place. Morphostasis occurs when 
the powers and liabilities of a structure remain the same and morphogenesis occurs when new forms of 
structure and consequently new conditions for action are created. Thus, the structural level pre-exists the 
agential level, and this is what is meant by providing a condition or set of conditions for action. However, 
at  the methodological level this creates certain problems because researchers can only examine those 
structural properties through their enactments or the exercising of their powers, and this can only occur  
through human actions.
Indicators which refer exclusively to pre-existent but real structural properties and from which causal  
sequences are subsequently inferred are likely to be misleading. Furthermore, critical realism is critical 
because educational and social researchers accept the idea that their investigations are fallible; and also 
because the various ways that the world is ordered, and this includes the categorical distinctions that
constitute the social order, are not self-justifying, but are determined by particular decisions made by 
individuals and groups of individuals stretching back in time, and are therefore always subject to critique 
and their possible replacement by a different set of categories and relationships. Cruickshank (2002, p.  
54) makes this point in the following way: ‘[c]ritical philosophy is therefore critical because it accepts 
neither the view that there are fixed philosophical first principles which guarantee epistemic certainty, nor 
the idea that first-order activities are self-justifying’.  Cruikshank further develops a notion of internal  
critique which he applies to both the justification for a critical realist position and those categories and 
relationships which act to structure the social world. If it is accepted that picture theories or mirror images  
of the relationship between the social world and how it can be described are not adequate (cf. Rorty,  
1980), then an alternative is required. However, even here any alternative theory has to be subjected to  
this internal critique and thus critical realists do not make the claim that it is possible to be certain about 
the correctness of the ontological framework that is being proposed. Fallibility therefore refers to both
the fact that researchers may not for practical and ethical reasons be able to collect data about the causal  
sequence that  concerns  them,  and also to  the  way they are  positioned,  whether  this  is  geographical, 
cultural or epistemological. As a result, fallibility cannot just be equated with inadequacy or insufficiency,  
but also implies that no epistemic certainty can be guaranteed.
Scientific Realism
Nash’s account of scientific realism cannot be easily summarised. However, it is necessary to attempt this  
because he wishes to distinguish between critical and scientific realism. At the ontological level, using his  
threefold hierarchical model of structure, disposition and practice, he sets out to provide a description of  
the  social  world  which  can  be  distinguished  from positivist  models  of  the  social  world.  Indeed,  he 
deplores the bypassing by statistical positivists of any attempt to provide a linkage between the three  
levels.  However, his solution is to continue to adopt many of the tenets and procedures of statistical  
modelling,  whilst  at  the same time arguing that  they do not  provide complete  explanations of social  
processes. He does suggest some semantic reconfiguring to make clear what is being attempted here:
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‘It would certainly help were realist thinkers in this field willing to adopt a set of concepts that makes it  
possible to speak about indicators rather than ‘measures’; of events, processes and states of affairs rather  
than ‘phenomena’; of variables as a reference to terms employed in a model; and of properties when 
referring to those features of the social world that have provided the data expressed by the variable.’ 
(Nash, 2005, p. 203) Furthermore, though he sidesteps the problems associated with the collection of
data about these indicators for the purposes of the argument that he is making, he still wants to in the first  
instance operate through the standard procedures of statistical positivists. He therefore may be sound at  
the  ontological  level,  though there  is  an  argument  even here  for  suggesting  that  he  objectivises  the 
different levels of social reality; however, he is not sound at the epistemological and methodological
levels, which require different types of approaches.
In Archer’s terms, Nash defends the use of quantitative modelling on the grounds that when morphostasis 
occurs there is some stability at the structural dimension or level. In other words, because reproduction  
rather than production has occurred, and it is likely that most morphostatic/morphogenetic cycles result in 
little change, then it is possible to argue that ‘there is no obstacle to the identification of systematic
patterns  of  a  kind  that  will  allow the  possibility  of  empirical  controls  for  the  purposes  of  scientific  
enquiry’ (Nash, 2005, p. 187). However, certain objections can be made to this. The first of these is that it 
ignores the possibility that morphogenesis rather than morphostasis has occurred; and second, it does not 
provide the means by which an investigator can determine whether morphostasis or morphogenesis is the  
end result of the cycle. Both of these objections create considerable problems, and again Nash’s solution  
is to develop an authentic narrative of causal processes where researchers would investigate which has 
occurred and in what way.  The problem for Nash is that at the same time and in thrall  to statistical  
modelling, he still wants to operate at the methodological level through indicators and processes which 
assume that morphostasis rather than morphogenesis has resulted.
If his conception of structure is relational, and is manifested through dispositional properties, then at the 
methodological level it would seem more appropriate for his indicators to refer to lived processes, rather 
than that those lived processes be inferred from sets of variables which may or may not be a part of the  
causal narrative that he is ultimately seeking to develop. If objects in the world have potential powers,
then at the methodological level, it is appropriate to examine how those powers are manifested; rather  
than collect information and data about social facts and then attempt to link these social facts together.  
The reason for doing it in this way is that those social facts may not actually represent what has gone on 
in the causal sequence that is the object of examination. Bhaskar (1979) expresses this in terms of his  
depth ontology when he suggests that there are trans-phenomenalist truths which relate to appearances,  
but these appearances may not refer to underlying structures or mechanisms; and even more significantly,  
there  may be counter-phenomenalist  truths  where these deep structures  or  mechanisms  may actually 
contradict, or be in conflict with, their appearances. However, researchers cannot know in any immediate 
sense what those deep structures are, because at the methodological level, the phenomena available for  
direct inspection are people’s accounts of what they did and why they did them, and their behaviours.
This however, has not addressed the place of mathematics in providing explanations of social activities; 
and  in  relation  to  this,  as  Nash  himself  acknowledges,  mathematical  modelling  based  on  traditional 
statistical notions is flawed. He takes my three objections to mathematical modelling (see Scott, 2000, pp.  
36–48) and subjects them to argument and critique. It is worth in the first instance reiterating those three 
arguments. First, educational activities operate within open as opposed to closed systems, which in effect 
means that the properties of objects being examined change over time, and though they might be labelled 
in the same way as they were before, this acts to conceal the fact that researchers are now dealing with a
different type of object with different types of potential powers to act causally. Second, because standard 
logic which underpins mathematical modelling of social events and processes is predicated on a notion of  
extensionality where ‘any two expressions of the same objects, i.e. having the same extension, can be  
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substituted freely for one another without changing the truth of the larger context’ (Wilson, 1987, p. 390), 
then intensional idioms, i.e. propositions that relate to beliefs, wishes, fears and intentions, have no place 
in  standard  logic,  and  thus  within  mathematical  modelling.  However,  what  this  implies  is  not  that 
mathematical modelling of educational events and processes is always inadequate, but that intensional 
idioms are reconfigured as extensional idioms so that formal calculations can be made and thus some 
meaning is logically bound to be lost. Third, because positivist and statistical explanations work through 
indicators which refer to properties of objects which may only exist at a particular moment of time this  
cannot allow causal explanations to be made.
Nash offers a number of counter-arguments. With regard to the first, he cites Bhaskar to the effect that the 
social world’s systemic openness does not rule out the possibility of expressing it in quantitative terms.  
Citing Bhaskar, of course, adds nothing to the argument because both Bhaskar and Nash might be wrong.  
It should also be said at this point that mathematical explanation may be adequate if the actual property of 
the object lends itself to such quantification; that is, if it relates to extension and not to intension. If the  
object under investigation has a property which allows it to be validly connected to other objects which  
have the same property, then a mathematical explanation will clearly suffice. In a similar fashion, Nash  
rejects my second argument by citing Bhaskar again to the effect that ‘social science must attempt to 
explain social events, processes, and states of affairs regardless of whether the intentions of action, that is  
to say the meanings actors give to their actions, are known’ (Nash, 2005, p. 190), on the grounds that it  
would unnecessarily restrict social scientists because such interpretations are not always available to the 
researcher, and furthermore ‘cannot be taken at face value’ (2005, p. 190). This is, I would suggest, a  
flawed argument, and the mistake that Nash makes is to equate what should happen with what does
happen. 
Critical realists do not expect to have such information readily at hand and indeed may never be in a  
position to collect it. However, all this tells us is that such explanation as a critical realist provides is 
always fallible on the two grounds that Nash identifies, not that the activity of explaining social events is  
adequate if such intentional activities are ignored. Bhaskar may insist that social science can proceed
without due attention being given to the beliefs of social agents; but to argue that this is because such 
information is not always available (this is accepted) or that such information cannot always be taken at  
face value (again this is accepted) is a non-sequitur.  Even if it is accepted that knowledge of beliefs and 
intentions  is  fallible,  this  does  not  mean  that  such  knowledge  is  not  an  essential  component  of 
understanding social life. Explanations can be produced without recourse to such beliefs and intentions, 
but a judgement has to be made as to whether this is a better state of affairs than one in which fallible 
judgements of these intentional states are made when the ontology that has been accepted comprises in  
part such elements.  A fuller defence of these three objections, and in particular, the third—that causal
explanations cannot be safely made using the methods and procedures of statistical positivism—needs in 
the first instance a preliminary discussion of the structural element and how it can be known.
Structures
If the structural level is understood as independent of and irreducible to the agential level, then in order to 
make an assessment as to whether it is possible to know what the properties of a structure are, researchers 
have to try to understand what a social structure is. Porpora (1998) suggests that it has been given four 
distinct meanings. The first of these is ‘patterns of aggregate behaviour that are stable over time’ (1998,
p. 339). The second is ‘law-like regularities that govern the behaviour of social facts’ (p. 339). The third 
is ‘systems of human relationships among social positions’ (p. 339); and the fourth is, following Giddens  
(1984), ‘collective rules and resources that structure behaviour’ (Porpora, 1998, p. 339). The first of these 
is methodologically individualist, in that social structures are treated as abstractions built up over time  
from observations of behaviours. Methodological individualism, as a social theory, is flawed because it  
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fails  to  take  account  of  structural  properties  that  are  causally  efficacious.  Critical  realists  allocate  
independent  powers  to  structure  and  agency;  methodological  individualists  deny  such  powers  to 
structures, and thus make redundant the separation of agency and structure.
The second idea of structure is law-like regularities that govern the behaviour of social facts. Such a holist  
position allows for the abandonment of any attempt to integrate the different levels of social reality, in  
that investigators would not need to know anything about the intentional dimension of human action.  
Furthermore, these law-like regularities would operate, in Archer’s (1995) terms, behind the backs of  
human actors, and thus represent structures as relations between reified objects with redundant powers 
and potentialities. The collection of social facts about pre-existent structural forms without reference to  
intentional behaviours cannot logically be construed as law-like because those structural forms are always  
likely to change as a result of interpretations and mediations by individuals and groups of individuals.
Furthermore, critical realists avoid structural determinism by arguing that both structures and agents have 
independent powers. For example, certain types of social structure—properties of organisations—allocate  
(formally  or  informally)  rewards  and sanctions  to  specific  actions.  If  an  action  is  performed  in  the 
designated way, then the role-holder is rewarded. If that action is not performed in the designated way,  
then sanctions are imposed on the role-holder. Furthermore, the attachment of rewards and sanctions to 
particular types of behaviours changes over time, and in part this happens because institutional roles are  
embedded  or  nested  in  other  structural  forms.  However,  structural  forms  do  not  determine  the  way 
individual post-holders behave, since they can only provide a set of conditions for action.
The  second  part  of  Nash’s  ontological  model  is  concerned  with  dispositions  to  act,  and  these  are 
described  as  properties  of  individuals.  By  construing  the  agential  level,  as  Nash  does,  as  sets  of  
dispositions rather than intentions and beliefs, he is in danger of reverting back to a form of structural 
determinism.  If  these  dispositions  are  merely  reflections  of  structural  properties,  then  they  have  no 
independent existence, and thus cannot be treated as part of a narrative of causal processes. If they are
merely abstractions from observations of behaviours, again they cannot be granted independent powers. 
Furthermore,  these  dispositions  cannot  be directly  inspected,  as  structures  in  turn  cannot  be  directly 
inspected; researchers can only observe sets of behaviours and then infer specific tendencies to act in  
specific ways. It would therefore be false to treat the structural part of the chain as a given from which
dispositions of individuals can be read off, which leads to certain practices. At the methodological level,  
structures cannot be known directly, but only through examination of how they impact on agency.
The third of Porpora’s models of structure is a relational one, in that social structure is treated as a nexus 
of relations between human beings so that agency and structure operate in a dialectical manner, both 
exerting an influence on the other, because both have independent powers. Porpora (1998, p. 344), for 
example,  argues  that:  [t]he  causal  effects  of  the  structure  on  individuals  are  manifested  in  certain  
structured interests, resources, powers, constraints and predicaments that are built into each position by 
the web of relationships. These comprise the material circumstances in which people must act and which  
motivate them to act in certain ways. As they do so, they alter the relationships that bind them in both 
intended and unintended ways. Giddens’s (1984) structuration model, which comprises Porpora’s fourth 
version of structure, is insubstantial in that those structures only have a virtual existence and thus exist  
exclusively in  the  minds of  individuals.  Some structures  work in  this way,  and discourses  have real  
powers to influence actions; however, to confine all structures to the realm of mind is to disregard their  
material  existence.  Both  of  these  versions,  Porpora’s  third  and fourth  models,  avoid  methodological 
individualism and structural determinism, and are thus to be preferred at the ontological level. Nash is  
clearly sympathetic  to  these  positions,  but  is  still  content  to  operate  at  the  methodological  level  by  
focusing on pre-existent structural properties which in effect marginalise agents as either the producers or 
reproducers of structures. My argument, therefore, now needs to address this methodological element and 
in particular Nash’s use of indicators.
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Indicators
Nash  makes  reference  to  the  Programme  for  International  Student  Assessment  (PISA)  data  set  
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2000, 2001) to illustrate his argument for the 
possibility of examining structures, dispositions and practices separately from each other. One of Nash’s  
indicators (extracted from the PISA study) is a quiet place to study. The preferred method is to ask the 
sample of students whether they have a quiet place to study,  and students are expected to provide an 
answer which can be subsequently expressed in aggregate form. In the case of the PISA data, this turns  
out to be 13% of the sample who claim not to have this facility. For our purposes here, it is important to  
ask what this might mean. The first and obvious answer to this question is that every room in the house
in which the respondent lives is at all times when that person wants to study so noisy (this being the  
opposite of quiet) that study is impossible. The respondent to the questionnaire is presumably making a  
judgement about their capacity to cope with a degree of noise whilst  studying and expressing it as a  
threshold above which studying becomes impossible. Further to this, they are making a judgement about 
how often this threshold is breached and generalising this in order to answer the question.
It is also important to examine the second part of the equation—the act of studying. Some pieces of work  
require greater degrees of concentration than others, and thus can only be completed in quieter conditions  
than other pieces of work. If we also add in the possibility that having a quiet place to study at home is  
not a requirement of the individual respondent because there is a quiet place of study readily available  
outside the home, then the relationship implied in the question—a quiet place of study in the home is a  
prerequisite for effective study—already looks shaky. Now, some of the issues raised by this analysis of 
the question being asked of respondents in the PISA study can be resolved by a detailed investigation of  
what each respondent means by not having a quiet place to study; however, they cannot be resolved by 
asking the question and then putting to one side the obvious differences in the assumptions made by 
respondents when they were answering it. If the question is being interpreted in different ways by those  
respondents, then no amount of statistical manipulation after the data collection event will compensate for
this. Unless the researcher can assure themselves that all the respondents are interpreting and answering 
the question in the same way, the subsequent quantitative analysis is almost totally meaningless.
Nash endorses the use of other indicators, for example, the number of books in a home, and then accepts 
the  claim  (made  in  the  first  place  by  the  PISA researchers)  that  this  tells  us  something  about  the  
relationship  between  reading  attainment  and  socio-economic  status.  There  are  a  number  of  other  
independent variables that he cites, and he also makes much of the relationships established through some 
fairly  standard  statistical  procedures  between  these  different  variables.  Once  again,  it  is  possible  to 
suggest that a standard measure of books in a home, even if it were accurately given by respondents, tells  
us very little about the influence of those books on the educational achievement or reading score of each 
individual respondent.
There may be a large number of books in the home which are simply there for show and are not read.  
Even  if  an  assumption  is  made  that  the  types  of  books  available  to  the  respondent  in  their  home 
environment are appropriate to the development of reading skills as measured in a standardised reading 
test, the information that has been collected does not tell us this. Only a detailed examination in each case 
will allow a proper judgement to be made of the worth of each indicator. Nash (2005, p. 200) is of course  
aware of  this,  when he  argues  that:  ‘[e]ven  if  the  implied  equivalence  could  be  given  to  an agreed 
interpretation, which is not the case, one would still be faced with the problem of constructing a narrative 
of causal processes. In fact, any substantive interpretation would have to be such a narrative. This is likely  
to be an area where reality is discontinuous, and subject to breaks with a qualitative effect, rather than 
linear in character.’ And yet, he still wants to suggest, as part of that chain of reasoning to determine a
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causal process, that indicators such as these (wealth, socio-economic status and number of books) can  
form part of this causal narrative, because, as he argues, they ‘do contribute to the development of certain 
cognitive and non-cognitive dispositions effective in generating reading performance’ (Nash, 2005, p.  
200). Ultimately his argument is that such indicators are useful because they point to causal relationships 
between two entities. What is then needed is detailed qualitative work which fills in the gaps. However, if  
the two variables that are being analysed together are conceptualised in terms of indicators which provide 
only a partial and possibly misleading account of the lived reality of the individual(s), then they cannot
be a substantive part of the causal narrative that is being developed.
Indicators are necessary to educational research. However, useful indicators as parts of a causal narrative  
need to conform to a number of principles: first, both agential and structural elements of the action being  
observed or being accessed through an account by a respondent are reflected in the indicator; second,  
such  an  indicator  refers  to  real  and  not  reified  properties  of  both  structures  and  agents;  and  third,  
appropriate indicators refer to causal properties of objects or entities. Nash’s use of indicators fails each 
of these three tests.
What  statistical  positivists  do (and Nash of course takes issue with such a position) is  to search for 
indicators  which  can  be  understood  in  the  same  way  by  large  numbers  of  respondents,  are  easily 
accessible, and can be quantified. So, for example, the indicator of the number of books in the home (used 
in the PISA study) meets the requirements of statistical positivists. It allows a simple form of counting
by  respondents  (though  in  the  PISA  study the  books  themselves  are  not  immediately  available  for  
inspection and thus have to be calculated from memory), is available for inspection by the respondent  
even if through memory,  and is expressed already in quantitative terms.  However, this measure is in  
reality a poor indicator since the number of books in the home cannot be a part of a causal narrative since 
books do not cause anything to happen. Only the reading and absorption of the knowledge in those books 
in the case we are considering here may cause an increase in reading skills for the individual. What the 
number of books does is provide a proxy for a process which then may be connected to a further process,  
and this is  that  the reading of these books causes learning to take place,  which may or may not  be  
reflected in an individual’s subsequent score in a standardised reading test. 
And the reason why it is a proxy is because that process of learning cannot be accessed in terms of the  
principles required by a statistical positivist. However, this is not to suggest that the presence of books in 
the home, or books of a particular kind, cannot form an important element in the causal narrative that is 
subsequently developed; only that it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the outcomes that  
follow. The problem is that data are collected, to use Nash’s terms, at a programme level rather than at a  
process level. What, however, cannot be avoided is the serious neglect of process when data are collected 
to represent a category of an individual action rather than a causal process at the agential level. However  
misguided or ignorant or perverse that person is, it is how they understand the impact of structures which 
influences what they do. But this only happens at each particular instance, and they may learn from that 
encounter/instance, as indeed they may learn from an encounter with a researcher, and thus their response  
to the same set of  conditions the next time round may be different.  Misguided, ignorant  or perverse  
behaviour by an individual may have no effect on structural properties. However, researchers should not 
assume that it will not.
Self-reports of events and processes cannot provide complete knowledge of relations between different  
events and states of being, i.e. poverty, homework, school achievement. This is because respondents may  
not be able to articulate the actual reasons for their actions; or because they may not be aware of other 
forces or structures that either condition their thinking or their actions; or because most behaviours are 
routine;  or  because they may be driven by unconscious desires and impulsions;  or  even because the 
interview  setting  may  be  so  structured  that  the  reporting  of  the  chain  of  reasoning  is  distorted  or 
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inadequate in some way. However, the important point is that the researcher has to try to collect data 
about  the  process—involving  a  chain  of  reasoning,  leading  to  a  series  of  actions,  leading  to  an 
understanding of events—and this can only be achieved by a detailed analysis of how individuals give 
meanings to the various parts of the process. Structural properties cannot be identified separately from 
their  instantiations.  Lay knowledge,  for all  its  inadequacies,  is  therefore  a crucial  determinant  in the 
causal  narrative that  is  being prepared.  Indeed,  good educational  accounts  do not  go far  beyond lay  
accounts, though they are not reducible to them.
A programme  investigation  cannot  tell  us  how the  different  levels  of  social  reality  interact.  Social 
structures are the result of a myriad of decisions made by individuals and collectivities of individuals,  
have  the  potentiality  to  change  their  nature,  and  cannot  be  investigated  separately  from  individual 
dispositions and practices; and if investigators choose otherwise, their findings are likely to be crude 
distortions of how those structures in fact worked as they impacted on individuals with their sets of
dispositions, habits and beliefs. Nash suggests a way forward, and then refuses to follow the logic of his 
argument. Critical realists do not, as he suggests, argue that statistical explanation is always misleading,  
only that, in order for mathematical modelling of social processes and events to reflect real-life processes  
and events, agential and structural properties have to be reconnected at the indicator level, ontological  
emergence and epistemological transitivity have to be accounted for in the explanation, and intensional  
idioms are not conflated with extensional ones.
Lived Realities
The key here is to examine, as Nash indicates, sequences of causal happenings or the lived reality of the  
individual—the third of my objections to mathematical modelling. The methodological point of entry into 
this process is the relationships between the agential and structural objects. If researchers act otherwise  
then they are in danger of reifying the properties of the relationship by treating elements of the causal  
sequence  as  generalised  to  a  group  of  people  and  not  addressing  how  those  people  were  actually  
implicated in the structural relationship, which may result in a misunderstanding of the nature of that  
structural relationship. The indicator therefore has to reflect the relationship between structure and agency 
in particular cases, and if researchers want to generalise then they have to examine the propensity of that  
relationship to be replicated in other cases. This is where extensional idioms can be legitimately used, and 
this also avoids the problem of using variables as expressions of an underlying reality. For example, racial  
categories,  in  the  positivistic  model,  have  to  be  externalised.  In  a  critical  realist  model,  racial  
categorisation,  being  a  part  of  the  lived  reality  of  the  individual,  takes  account  of  how individuals 
understand their racial and ethnic identities, and is thus real. Critical realism therefore does not preclude 
the use of statistical methods; but it does argue for the use of methods and indicators which reflect the  
close relationship between structure and agency, refer to real and not reified properties of both structure  
and agency, and allow a causal narrative to be developed.
The issue of much positivistic research actually imposing a set of categories on the way we live and thus  
not merely describing but creating reality is a consequence of the argument,  but not one that will  be 
pursued here in any great depth. Indeed, Nash (2005, p. 201) hints at this when he suggests that much  
positivistic statistical modelling is ideological: ‘ And when it is suspected, as critical realism does suspect, 
that the language of statistical modelling bears the taint of ideology, the accounts of statistical modelling 
seem not only inadequate and incomplete but systematically misleading and therefore to be rejected.
This  happens  because  categories  and  relations  which  constitute  the  social  order  are  reified  at  the  
methodological  level,  and ontological  emergence is  not  given a prominent  position in the scheme of  
things. Categories and relations are therefore treated as givens, rather than being understood as the results  
of decisions made by individuals and groups of individuals in the present and stretching back in time.
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Notes
1. The term ‘positivism’ has acquired a variety of meanings, and is even used by some theorists as a term 
of abuse. Outhwaite (1987) has suggested that there are three principal varieties of positivism, the last of  
which is relevant in this context. The first, popularised by Auguste Comte, is where causal laws can be  
derived from observations and these observations are value-free. However, this does not imply that a  
common method for the natural and social sciences can be developed. The second variant,  known as 
logical positivism, espoused a form of nominalism, and at the same time suggested that the methods of  
the natural sciences could be applied to the social sciences. Finally, the third variant, variable analysis, led  
to the development of statistical explanations for social phenomena in the form of universal laws or
generalisations,  constructed  from  the  constant  conjunctions  of  events.  This  third  variant  has  been 
critiqued extensively by, amongst others, critical realists who have developed a social theory based on a 
depth and stratified ontology.
2. Claims have been made that certain types of physical phenomena change their form as a result of being 
observed or investigated. However, no claims have been made that these physical phenomena consciously 
do so, through a process of reflection and transformation. Social phenomena have this capacity and this  
can be expressed as learnt behaviour during the process of investigation, as well as reflection on and 
transformation of those categorical distinctions that structure the social world.
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